Vertical · Healthcare
26 deals + 11 tier-1 leads
36 leading investors, 666 investments, 403 companies, 759 founders.
Where did the money go?
666 investments, highly concentrated.
Top 10 = $528B, accounting for 81% of the total. Top 30 = 90%. The remaining 373 companies split less than 20%.
Oct 2024 – Apr 2026 total $649B funding, aggregated by company. Dark = Top 10 (528B / 81%), gray = 11–30 (the rest).
ighty percent of the capital went to ten companies. That's money in the bank, not pledges.
Concentration doesn't mean the door is closed. Outside the Top 30, another 120 early-stage companies raised Seed or Series A: Rillet (Vertical AI · $95M), Emergent (Agents & Applications · $93M), Aspora (Other Tech · $88M), Modus (Agents & Applications · $85M), Gimlet Labs (AI Infra · $80M). They're scattered across the long tail.
The question: within that 80%, how much is genuine consensus from multiple VCs, and how much is a single big bet creating a mirage?
From companies to sectors—separating real heat from fake heat.
30 sub-sectors absorbed 92% of the capital. Only a handful pass all three tests: high deal count, high valuations, and multiple lead investors. The rest owe their heat to one VC betting big on one company.
3 columns measure deal count / valuation density / lead ecosystem breadth. Darker color = higher rank. All 3 columns dark = true consensus; only 1-2 dark = single VC or single company inflating the average.
hree metrics must all rank in the top quartile for a sector to qualify as genuinely hot: deal count, median valuation, and number of distinct lead investors. Only 3 sectors pass: General LLM, Coding Agents, Cloud Compute.
Databases is a textbook fake-hot: ranks #10 in deal count, #2 in valuation, but only 3 lead investors. The entire sector's valuation is propped up by Databricks ($134B) alone. Self-driving is the same pattern—Wayve single-handedly inflates the average. Healthcare is the opposite: plenty of deals, multiple leads, but valuations haven't taken off yet.
How big is a typical round in each sector at each stage?
From sector granularity to stage granularity: typical single-round size at each stage.
52 sectors × 5 stages, median single-round raise. This isn't cohort survival—companies in the window are at different stages, so you can't read "how many make it." What you can read: at each stage, how big is a typical check.
Median single-round funding for 52 verticals at each stage (log scale). Top 10 highlighted, 42 others as background. This is not survival rate — different companies at different stages within an 18-month window cannot be read as 'how many survived.'
hree sectors, three rhythms.Foundation Models runs mega-rounds throughout: Seed $220M, Series A $1.3B, Series B $627M, Series C $2.0B, Series D+ $13B. Small teams can't even get a ticket.
Coding Agents follows the SaaS growth playbook: Series A $55M, Series B jumps 4× to $218M, Series C doubles again to $400M, then growth slows post-D. Early rounds price in fast; later rounds price in customers and retention.
Vertical Healthcare takes the smallest steps, but each is backed by revenue: Series A $32M, Series B $141M, Series C $126M, Series D+ $363M. Other Agent Apps has the lowest barrier: Seed $30M, Series A $29M. Less capital, but competition is also scattered.
Now look at whose hands the money comes from.
Who leads, how many co-invest—that determines if someone picks up the next round.
29 firms × 46 sectors, 279 lead rounds. The column header shows how many independent firms have led in that sector. Higher number = more potential lead investors for your next round.
Columns = sectors (sorted by distinct lead investors), rows = 29 active VCs (sorted by total leads). Darker cells = higher concentration in that sector.
nly 31 sectors have been led by ≥ 3 independent VCs. The most concentrated is General LLM: 22 firms, 30 total leads. The top three are Shanghai Guotou Pioneer Fund×3, SoftBank Vision Fund×3, Lightspeed Venture Partners×2.
5 sectors have only one lead investor: Vertical · Education, Creative Tools, MLOps, Other. If that fund changes direction or closes, you're starting from scratch for your next round.
The most active firm is Andreessen Horowitz, with 45 leads across 22 sectors—16% of the total sample.
All those numbers are nominal. How much is real cash vs. compute credits on paper?
Nominal amounts aren't the same as cash in bank.
639/666 deals are pure cash. The other 22 are compute-for-equity or hybrids, comprising 72% of nominal value. The gap between headline numbers and actual cash can be 2–5×.
Grouped by investor type - the 4 cards above show capital structure breakdown rules; the 3 iceberg bars below show the gap between mega deal headlines and actual cash.
wo ledgers: press-release figures and actual cash are different numbers. Crunchbase records press releases; this report tracks both—headline amounts and real cash equivalents, side by side.
Microsoft × OpenAI (Oct 2025): The press release said $250B. Zero immediate cash—all five-year Azure lock-in. Cash equivalent $75B, a 30% haircut.
Amazon × Anthropic (Apr 2026): Nominal $25B ($5.0B cash + extended commitment), but Anthropic must commit $100B back to AWS. Cash equivalent $5.0B, a 20% haircut. Compare that to the Nov 2024 deal, which only discounted 12%. In two years, the cash-to-compute ratio in cloud giant contracts shifted from 9:1 to 1:4.
NVIDIA × OpenAI (Sep 2025): Letter of intent for $100B cash + $100B tied to GB200 purchases. Cash equivalent ranges from $10B to $100B—the spread itself signals structural uncertainty.
For contrast: Microsoft × Anthropic (Nov 2025) was pure cash $5.0B, press release = cash equivalent. That's a normal round.
Putting the same dollar into AI-native vs. AI-augmented is each investor's answer to "what is AI."
AI-native: remove AI, the product doesn't exist. AI-augmented: AI is a feature module. Line up 35 investors by this ratio, and each bar is a fund's answer to "what is real AI."
35 active investors sorted by AI-native share descending. Dark = AI-native deals, light = AI-augmented deals. Bar length = total deal count. Dashed baseline = dataset deal-weighted average 76%.
eal-weighted average: 76% AI-native. A majority bet on native.
But zoom in to individual funds and the split is sharper than labels suggest. Greylock Partners, often perceived as old SaaS money, has 88% AI-native (24/27)—more aggressive than any other Sand Hill firm. Andreessen Horowitz talks "building the future" but runs only 69% (58/83). Managing 83 bets naturally requires diversification.
Most focused: Menlo Ventures at 96%—only native platforms. Most indifferent to the AI-native label: Founders Fund (58%), SoftBank Vision Fund (44%), and Balderton Capital (39%). Founders Fund's logic: Anduril, Hadrian—AI is a component, not the product. SoftBank and Balderton buy revenue growth, not technical definitions.
Beyond the mainstream bets, are there overlooked mega-sectors?
Beyond foundation models and agents, three sectors rank highest by single-round size.
Foundation models and agents dominate the headlines. But rank by single-round size, three sectors lead: Defense AI, Robotics & Embodied Intelligence, Vertical Legal. Combined: 45 companies, 65 deals, $23.3B. Each has at least one company valued above $10 billion.
hat these three have in common: model quality doesn't matter much. Defense AI sells "don't break in combat." Embodied AI's bottleneck is motors and gearboxes, not algorithms. Legal AI wraps existing APIs with compliance guardrails, billing for work that used to cost $600/hour. Pricing in these businesses tracks contract value, not model capability.
Helsing is in Germany, Wayve in the UK, Agibot in China, Legora in Sweden. Not one of them is in the Bay Area. The AI capital map is more complex than "Silicon Valley plus China."
Same round, different regions—valuations can differ by 3×.
666 investments split into 14 capital-flow routes. Foreign capital into the US: 88 deals (13%); China's internal circulation: 74 deals, with only 2 flowing out. Europe's Series A post-money median is one-third of Silicon Valley's—the most visible entry-price gap in the dataset.
Note on scope: this chapter aggregates all 666 investments (including 14 historical-context deals from 2024-02..2024-09). A strict 18-month window (2024-10..2026-04) yields 652, with CN→CN ≈ 68 / US→US ≈ 383 / US→EU ≈ 55 / EU→EU ≈ 49—same shape, same arbitrage thesis.
Left = capital origin (investor HQ); Right = deal target (company HQ). Ribbon width proportional to deal count; color by origin. Click a ribbon to see top 5 companies in that corridor.
S→US: 389 deals, the largest corridor. SG→US 29, ME→US 21, JP→US 15, EU→US 21. Global capital flows one-way into Silicon Valley.
Series A post-money median: US $1.5B (n=23), Europe $500M (only 33% of US, n=5), China $500M (n=3, very small sample). Same stage, same window—Europe and China price significantly below the US. This is the dataset's clearest entry-price gap. Capital sources: US→EU 56, plus EU local 50. China is a closed loop—no foreign capital inflow recorded in the dataset.
Stack the signals from the first nine chapters, and eight sectors emerge.
Five dimensions scored: deal density lead diversity recent acceleration entry round size valuation runway. Thresholds: ≥4 deals, ≥3 lead investors, ≤50 deals (excludes saturated mega-tracks). Take the top 8.
5 signals, weighted composite: deal density, lead diversity, recent acceleration, entry ticket, valuation runway. Candidate filter: 18-mo deals >= 4, unique leads >= 3, deals <= 50 (excludes saturated mega-tracks).
26 deals + 11 tier-1 leads
25.6x B-round step-up + 24 deals
13 Q1 closes + 6 tier-1 leads
18 deals + 7 tier-1 leads
7 tier-1 leads + 6.8x B-round step-up
20 deals + 3.5x 18-mo acceleration
5 Q1 closes + 3.9x B-round step-up
6.0x 18-mo acceleration + 6 tier-1 leads
alculated, not curated. #1 Vertical · Healthcare: score 0.86, 26 deals, 11 lead investors, recent acceleration 4.0×. The algorithm is public—change the weights and re-rank.
Common thread: no foundation models, no self-driving. Those are either saturated or dominated by one or two giants. Verticals dominate (2 vertical sectors + 3 agent apps)—all concrete workflows that general-purpose models can't directly replace. Entry barriers are moderate: median round size $29M, median lead count 7.
One last variable: who are the founders who got funded?
Who are the founders getting funded.
759 founders, 403 companies. Four panels: prior-company distribution, serial vs. first-time by region, PhD share by sector, top 10 schools.
759 founders enriched with prior company, education, PhD status, serial founder status, and nationality. Four panels: prior company clusters, serial vs first-time, academic intensity, top schools. Click any row in Panel A to drill down.
Click any row to expand the founder list for that cluster
Left = serial founder share; longer bars indicate higher serial ratio
Overall average 28% (dashed line)
verall: 28% PhDs, 26% serial entrepreneurs. Foundation-model founders are majority PhDs; AI infrastructure about one-third; verticals see PhD shares drop notably. The two longest bars in Panel A: academia (publish then start) and acquired startups (cash out then re-enter).
PhD share by region: US 25%, Europe 33%, China 55%. Chinese founders have the highest academic credentials—Tsinghua/Peking PhDs plus GPU/robotics hard-tech combos are most common. US big-tech alumni and serial founders bring the average down.
Anthropic: 6/7 from OpenAI; Jared Kaplan from academia. Cursor: 4/4 studied or just graduated from MIT—no big-tech stints. Mistral's bench is DeepMind London + FAIR Paris. Moore Threads: all three founders from AMD China. Biren: one AMD, one SenseTime.
All data from public datasets: 666 investments, 403 companies, 36 investors, 759 founders. Source data, methods, and limitations are fully disclosed in Chapter XII.
Data sources, methods, limitations.
Data window, coverage, limitations, source ledger, raw downloads.
The observation window runs from October 2024 to April 2026, an 18-month span. The starting point: the week OpenAI closed its $6.6Bconvertible note (valuation $157B) on 2024-10-02— the first inflection point in frontier-model valuations within the current AI capital cycle. The endpoint: late April 2026, capturing the closing of Anthropic Series G, xAI Series E, Mistral Series C, and Wayve Series D mega-rounds. All timestamps use the announced date (public press release), not closing date or wire date.
Handling out-of-window context anchors: To preserve full funding history for anchor companies, the dataset retains 14 deals from 2024-02..2024-09 as context (e.g., SSI 2024-09 Series A, Wayve 2024-05 Series C, Cohere 2024-07 Series D), allowing Ch9/Ch11 to trace founder paths and anchor-valuation trajectories. A strict 18-month filter (announced date ≥ 2024-10-01) yields investments = 652, unique companies ≈ 395. This report aggregates by the full 666 (structural conclusions hold under strict-window filtering); for strict-window analysis, reference _meta.total_investments_strict_window (= 652).
27 anchor investors (must_have + recommended lists), plus 47 known external entities = 83 investor nodes.9 Shanghai SOE vehicles were unbundled into separate entities, so the 27 anchors expand to 36 at the node level.
Source-URL coverage has two layers: every investment record has at least one public source (100%, 666/666); company profiles (founded year, HQ, one-liner, founders, ai_layer, etc.—15+ fields) hit 95% coverage. The uncovered 5% are mostly stealth companies or early-stage projects with only founder LinkedIn as the single source.
Four known boundaries that readers should note when citing this dataset.
total_committed in the dataset shows $446.65B; Anthropic shows $97.85B. These two figures should not be summed directly: in mega-rounds, individual investor tickets are not disclosed, so everyone's nominal_commitment is filled with the round total, causing cross-investor sums to double-count. Correct approach: aggregate at the round level using round_total_usd.cash_equity(though most carry GPU commitments, they're not credit-for-equity structures); Alibaba's "soft lock-ins" in Zhipu / Moonshot are not split out.The table below lists source links for every investment record in the dataset. By default it shows the top 50 by announced date descending; click "Load 50 more" to paginate, or "Show all" to expand all 666 rows. For offline auditing, "Download dataset.csv" provides the full flat file (three tables joined into a single file).
| Date | Investor | Company | Round | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr 2026 | Series F | |||
| Apr 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Apr 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Apr 2026 | Series B | |||
| Apr 2026 | Series B | |||
| Apr 2026 | Series C | |||
| Apr 2026 | Series G | |||
| Apr 2026 | Series A | |||
| Apr 2026 | Pre-Seed | |||
| Apr 2026 | Seed | |||
| Apr 2026 | Series A | |||
| Apr 2026 | Series C | |||
| Apr 2026 | Seed | |||
| Apr 2026 | Series B | |||
| Apr 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Apr 2026 | Series A | |||
| Apr 2026 | Series A | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series A | |||
| Mar 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Mar 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Mar 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Mar 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Mar 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Mar 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Mar 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Mar 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Mar 2026 | Seed | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series A | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series A | |||
| Mar 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series C | |||
| Mar 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series B | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series A | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series A | |||
| Mar 2026 | Pre-Seed | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series A | |||
| Mar 2026 | Seed-Extension | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series C | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series C | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series C | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series C | |||
| Mar 2026 | Strategic | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series A | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series G | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series A | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series B | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series A | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series F | |||
| Mar 2026 | Series A |
Raw data is provided in two formats:
The dataset is released under CC BY 4.0 — commercial use and derivative work permitted with attribution.
Personal capacity. This report is published by the author in an independent personal capacity. All views, judgments, and phrasings are the author's personal opinions and do not represent the position of the author's current or former employers, nor of any investor, portfolio company, limited partner (LP), or any other third party.
Data sources. All data cited in this report is sourced from public channels — company announcements, press releases, regulatory filings, mainstream financial media, and publicly available third-party databases. No private, internal, or NDA-protected data is used. Source URLs for every investment record can be audited line-by-line in the Source URL Ledger in §04.
No conflicts of interest. The author has no employment, consulting, advisory, board, equity, debt, or any other economic relationship with any investor, fund (GP / LP), or portfolio company referenced in this report. The contents are not sponsored, reviewed, or influenced by any external party.
Not investment advice. This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, securities recommendations, or any offer or solicitation. Readers should make independent judgments and assume responsibility for their own investment decisions; the author is not liable for any consequences arising from the use of this report. Reasonable efforts have been made to verify the data, but no express or implied warranty is made as to its completeness, accuracy, or timeliness.